The Vehicle/Content-Confusion Objection
In any argument, the vehicle/content-confusion objection (VCCO) can be summarised as follows:
VCCO: Theory/solution/argument P is mistaken because it confuses vehicles of representation with contents of representation.
When you represent anything, you can refer to two things related to that representation: (a) the representation’s vehicle and (b) the representation’s content. This applies to any form of representation. It is hard to imagine a concept of representation where one cannot refer to both. (I’ve discussed things related to this elsewhere — in my post on kinds of ‘content’).
So what are representational vehicles and representational contents, and what’s the difference between them?
Given what representation is applied to, i.e., language, art, mind and perception, I can’t say much generally. This is part of the problem I’m discussing here. But let’s take it for language.