My next academic publication is ‘Relative and Absolute Presence’, a chapter in a forthcoming book by Springer entitled ‘Philosophy and Psychology of Time’ (eds.: Molder, B., Arstila, V. & Øhrstrøm, P.). In revising that paper, I cut a lot out. In particular, I cut out two subjects which, although relevant and interesting, would have stretched the paper to unreasonable length:
(a) Thinking about different models of time-perception and time-consciousness in light of different concepts of time (A-theory, B-theory) and presence (relative presence, absolute presence).
(b) A discussion on the relationship between the experience of presence, relative presence and absolute presence.
In the next work-related post, I’m going to cover ‘a’–and maybe ‘b’. Today —before that–I just want to throw up some of the diagrams I’ll be using. These are diagrams of, under different series of time, retentionalism and extensionalism. I also give a rough definition of the positions–but they are very brief and subject to revision. The diagrams should do the exposition here.
[A note on use: These diagrams are of my own making. I am very happy for anyone to use these if they wish to do so. However, although I’m sure the following is obvious, if you do use them, please let me know (a link would be great, too) and acknowledge their source (i.e., here) in your usage. And, of course, thank you for using them.]
Very rough definition: The view that time-consciousness, experience of a duration or things happening over a duration, can be explained by a tripartite structure to consciousness–of
(i) primary impression (for the immediate or immanent present),
(ii) retention (for the just-past) and (often left out in discussion)
(iii) protention (for the near-future).
1.2 In the A-series and B-series
Very rough definition: the view that time-consciousness, experience of a duration or things happening over a duration, can be explained by consciousness extending over that duration (of things happening).